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In this issue of Neuron, a study by Chiu et al. examines the brain responses of autistic volunteers in a trust
game. The findings reveal an unusual lack of brain activity in mid cingulate cortex when they make their
investments. We speculate that this may arise because autistic individuals are unaware that they will also
gain or lose reputation in their partner’s eyes.A study in this issue of Neuron details
how Chiu et al. (2008) have measured
brain activity (using fMRI) while volun-
teers, who are classified as being at the
high-functioning end of the autistic spec-
trum, were engaged in a simple social
interaction. The task was an iterated trust
game in which two subjects take turns as
investor or trustee. The investor chooses
how much to money to invest. This cho-
sen amount is tripled on its way to the
trustee, and the trustee then chooses
how much to repay to the investor. Read
Montague and his colleagues have stud-
ied this game extensively in large groups
of volunteers and have observed a char-
acteristic pattern of brain activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex. When making
an investment (self phase), transient in-
creases in activity are seen in an area of
mid cingulate cortex (7 < y < 14 in Talair-
ach coordinates). When learning what sum
has been repaid (other phase), transient
increases are seen in posterior cingulate
(43 < y < 41) and anterior cingulate
(25 < y < 42). The high-functioning autistic
volunteers in this study did not differ in
their behavior in the trust game, but did
show a significantly different pattern of
brain activity. They did not show the char-
acteristic activity increase in the mid cin-
gulate cortex during the self phase.
There are a number of reasons why we
consider this to be an important and excit-
ing result. It is now widely agreed that
autism is a biological disorder associated
with specific brain abnormalities (Bock
and Goode, 2003). However, the precise
nature of these abnormalities remains
obscure. A key, defining feature of the dis-
order is impairment in reciprocal social
interactions stemming from a specificproblem with mentalizing or ‘‘theory of
mind’’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). A num-
ber of previous studies have investigated
patterns of brain activity associated with
mentalizing in autism, but the tasks used
have not directly involved two-way social
interactions (Frith, 2001). Volunteers have
observed social interactions or have an-
swered questions about them, but have
not been themselves engaged in social
communication. In the study by Chiu and
colleagues, however, the volunteers were
directly engaged in a social interaction.
Importantly, the results suggest that the
abnormality associated with autism is re-
stricted to only one phase of the inter-
active game: the point where the autistic
volunteer makes an investment, not the
point where the autistic volunteer is told
about the repayment made by their part-
ner. Additional results from Read Monta-
gue’s group give further clues as to the
implications of this result. First, the same
pattern of activity in cingulate cortex is
observed when volunteers are shown pic-
tures of people engaged in athletic activi-
ties and asked to imagine themselves
taking part. This is further evidence as to
the nature of the cognitive process associ-
ated with this pattern of activity: it involves
thinking about the self acting in a social
context. Second, the characteristic pat-
terns of activity in the cingulate cortex
are only observed when the trust game
is played with a human partner. No such
distinct patterns emerge when the game
is played in the absence of a responsive
social partner.
Does this result show that autistic peo-
ple play the game as if they were not inter-
acting with a socially responsive partner?
No. The result is more subtle than that. TheNeuron 57pattern of brain activity in cingulate cortex
is consistent with this idea for the self
phase, but for the other phase, the autistic
volunteers resemble controls when play-
ing with a responsive social partner. This
is an exciting result because it suggests
that some mechanisms of social interac-
tion are intact in these high-functioning
cases. What is the critical difference be-
tween the self phase and the other phase?
We believe that the simple distinction of
self versus other is not adequate. In the
pictures of athletic activity, in which vol-
unteers were asked to imagine them-
selves taking part, there are many players.
At least part of the imagining must involve
thinking about how one would fit in with
the group, and how other group members
would evaluate one’s performance. Actu-
ally, this is a question about the kind of
reputation one might gain in the eyes
of the others. Likewise, in the self phase
of the trust game, the amount one invests
can be seen as a measure of how much
one trusts one’s partner. It is not just giv-
ing an amount of money; it is giving a sig-
nal to the other person: ‘‘trust me’’ and ‘‘I
trust you’’ (see Figure 1). In other words, at
the point of investment we are predicting
what the effect of our investments is going
to be on the behavior of our partners. In
the other phase of the game, we are also
evaluating a signal. But there is a differ-
ence. The evaluation is after the fact. We
know what the investment is. We are not
at this point trying to build our reputation
in the other player’s eyes.
Where is the difference in the autistic
brain? It is in the self phase, which we
have now relabeled reputation manage-
ment phase. It involves higher-order men-
talizing: you care what another person, February 7, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 331
Figure 1. Earning the Respect of Others
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Previewsthinks of you, and even further, you care
that the other person trusts you.You would
not do this when playing against a com-
puter. In autism there is no difference.
Given that autistic people have mentalizing
difficulties, such higher-order representa-
tions in fast on-line interaction are proba-
bly too difficult. In a truly reciprocal interac-
tion, other people’s thoughts of us are the
means to see the value of our own actions.
This goes far beyond the value of the in-
vestment in money. This is where we find
the real reward for our interactions.
However, if the autistic volunteer ap-
proaches the task with an impoverished
analysis of the interaction, should we not
expect to detect a difference in behavior?
This is a perennial problem when brain
imaging is used in the study of abnormal
groups. On the one hand, experimenters
will go to great trouble, as have Chiu and
colleagues, to make sure that patients
and controls are matched on behavior.
Otherwise critics will rightly point out that
the differences in brain activity might sim-
ply be a consequence of differences in be-
havior and therefore tell us nothing about
critical differences in brain function be-
tween the groups. On the other hand, if
the abnormal group is engaging a different
brain system to perform the task, then it
must be possible, by using the right task,
to demonstrate differences in behavior.
What differences in behavior might we
expect find in the behavior of autistic vol-
unteers? One clue might come by identi-
fying the changes that occur when normal
volunteers play economic games against
a computer rather than a responsive so-
cial partner. In the ultimatum game the re-
jection of low offers can be seen as a form
of altruistic punishment, through which
we try to change the behavior of the
person making the low offer. There would
be no point in such behavior if we were
playing against a computer. Indeed it has
been observed that lower offers are ac-
cepted if people believe the offer is made
by a computer (Rilling et al., 2004) or on
the basis of the spin of a roulette wheel
(Blount, 1995). Do autistic volunteers
make this distinction between playing
against people versus computers? If so,
then they must be thinking about the effect
that their behavior has on the other player.
In the same way it would be possible to
study whether people are thinking about
their reputation in the eyes of others. In332 Neuron 57, February 7, 2008 ª2008 Elsethe dictator game there is no reason to
make good offers except to bolster our
reputation. Evidence for this comes from
the observation that smaller offers are
made in this game when the player has
complete anonymity (Hoffman et al.,
1996). When playing against a person,
we will have some regard for what that
person, as well as the experimenter or
other observer, thinks about us. When
playing against a computer, only the opin-
ion of the experimenter would be relevant.
If autistic players show such distinctions,
then they must have some representation
of their reputation in the minds of others.
Investigation of variations in behavior
and brain activity when playing against
people or computers would enable us to
pinpoint more precisely the missing pro-
cesses in the autistic player.
Finally we must consider what we can
learn from the location of the deviant
activity in the autistic brain. The authors
adopt a very ingenious, but somewhat
eccentric, method of analysis: looking at
the pattern of activity across the whole of
the cingulate cortex. This makes compar-
ison with previous studies problematic.
The pattern of activity associated with re-
payment is reminiscent of that seen in the-
ory-of-mind tasks, with activity in both
posterior and anterior cingulate. How-
ever, mentalizing is more typically associ-
ated with activity in paracingulate cortex.
According to Tomlin et al. (2006), the pat-
tern seen across anterior cingulate cortex
is not replicated across the paracingulate
cortex. However, critically, the deviant
pattern of activity associated with autism
was not observed in this theory-of-mind
region, but in a region of mid cingulate
cortex. This region roughly corresponds
to the rostral cingulate zone of Picardvier Inc.and Strick (1996). The region has been as-
sociated with response selection or deci-
sion. Indeed a recent study of decision-
making in a volatile environment (Behrens
et al., 2007) suggests that the rostral cin-
gulate zone is associated with decision
making (8 < y < 20), while a more anterior
region is associated with monitoring (32 <
y < 36). These coordinates are consistent
with the results reported by Chiu et al.,
and fit well with the trust game: the self
phase is the point where the subject de-
cides what response to make, while the
other phase is the point where the subject
monitors what effect his investment has
produced. The problem with equating the
results of Chiu et al. with those of Beh-
rens and colleagues is that the latter task
(and those used in previous studies with
similar results) did not involve interaction
with a responsive social being, but with
a complex one-armed bandit. It will be
exciting to investigate whether decision-
making tasks of a sufficient or certain
kind of complexity can recreate the expe-
rience of interacting with another person.
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